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ABSTRACT
ANNA GRAY TERRY: La Alegría Ya Viene: How Chile’s Youth are Reshaping History
(Under the direction of Professor Kate Centellas)
 The highly controversial military dictatorship in Chile lasted from 1973 to 
1989. General Augusto Pinochet’s neoliberal policies saved the country from 
economic ruin in the 1980’s, but Chile became highly socially unequal as a result. 
After he was democratically voted out of office, politicians decided not to change 
his economic policies in order to avoid a collapse, and those policies are still in 
place today, specifically in terms of education. Therefore, an entire generation of 
Chileans has grown up after the dictatorship under these same highly unequal 
education policies, and as a result, they have begun to protest. What started in 
2011 has become a national movement for a more equal education system. This 
has manifested itself in violent protests as well as negative imagery of Pinochet 
throughout Chile. This thesis explores the relationship between the education 
movement and formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further, 
what role young Chileans play in said formation. By highlighting how young 
Chileans view Chile’s relationship to the past, it is possible to assess what kind of 
future they want their country to have.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction
 Mid-way through my semester abroad in Valparaíso, Chile, in the spring of 2013, 
the university I was attending, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, was 
declared to be en paro, at a stop. This was not because of a natural disaster or some 
disgruntled employees, but because its students had voted it so. For the entire second half 
of the semester, only the foreign students attended classes. Meanwhile, there were dozens 
of demonstrations where hundreds of students would dress in black and march through 
the town, and they often became violent: Students would release tear gas, break windows, 
and deface buildings. This happened with enough frequency to the point that residents 
became immune to the fuss. At one point, our building’s status went from en paro to en 
toma, taken over, and students barricaded the classrooms with chairs and desks and 
walked around on the roofs to make sure no one could enter. It was terrifying for me, but 
for the average Chilean student, this was normal. Violent protests were happening in 
universities throughout Chile, and they had been happening every semester since 2011. 
 Students are demanding change. The current secondary and tertiary education 
system is highly unequal: high-quality high schools and universities are expensive, the 
cheap universities lack distinction, and there are laws keeping this in place. It has not 
always been this way, though. Before the 1970’s, higher learning was universally free, 
but Chile’s right-wing dictatorship of 1973-1990 put an end to free education. Among 
other neoliberal reforms, General Augusto Pinochet completely privatized the education 
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system, offering no subsidies to public high schools and universities or grants or loans for 
students, leaving students with the only option for quality education as expensive private 
schools. This made the education system highly unequal, and although some policies 
have changed since Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989, the education system 
remains almost completely the same as the way it did when it was instituted by Pinochet. 
 One of the most interesting things about the movement for educational reform is 
that Chileans are only beginning to protest this now. There have been sporadic protests 
since 2007, but only in the last two years has Chile made waves in demanding change. 
Curiously, protests for educational reform did not happen as soon as Chile became a 
democracy. Rather, twenty years later, especially while the rest of Latin American 
countries’ higher education systems have been either free or very cheap and Chile’s 
higher education system is some of the most expensive in the world. So why is Chile 
protesting now specifically?
Public Memory
 The lens through which I would like to answer this question is public memory, 
because the generation of Chileans who are protesting is the generation whose only frame 
of reference of the Pinochet regime is public memory and personal recollections of their 
elders. Before defining what public memory is, it should be noted that the term “public” 
refers to what can be seen or accessed by anyone in a given area. In the context of my 
studies, this will refer to newspapers, movies, documentaries, artwork, buildings, 
monuments, music, and so on, which are all vehicles through which people can express 
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their perspectives in a way that anyone can see. It is with this definition that public 
memory can be understood. According to a John Bodnar, a leading public memory 
theorist and historian, public memory is defined as a 
body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society 
understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future. . . [It] 
speaks primarily  about the structure of power in society because that 
power is always in question in a world of polarities and contradictions and 
because cultural understanding is always grounded in the material 
structure of society itself. (Bodnar 15-17)
In other words, public memory is a way to understand how a culture attempts to 
understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory by using 
the media aforementioned to reflect upon past events, which will ideally influence those 
who view it to consider what the creators want the viewers to believe about the historical 
event and be changed by it. And then, if enough people’s perspectives on a historical 
event are influenced by a display of public memory, that can have important implications 
on what the society chooses to let happen in the future. Therefore, the creation of public 
memory ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by making statements about the 
past. 
 According to anthropologist and public memory specialist Alexander Dent, there 
are two types of cultural practice that create public memory: “inscribing ones, in which 
participants pay explicit attention to the inculcation of memory, and incorporating ones, 
where memory slips in without much being said” (Dent 188). Inscribing cultural practices 
take shape in museums, statues, slogans, and so on, whereas the latter consists of 
“performances that inculcate history through the physical experience,” meaning physical 
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experiences like ritual (Dent 189). In other words, inscribing practices are the active 
formation of public memory while incorporating practices are passive. Inscribing 
practices specifically and intentionally create a particular interpretation of a historical 
moment, and are thus a highly active and calculated way to create an argument about 
something. While incorporating cultural experiences are an important aspect of the 
creation of public memory, the majority of my studies will be about the inscription of 
public memory because I want to find out if there is an intentionally created link between 
public memory of the dictatorship and the student protests, on which I will elaborate in 
the next section. 
 The use of inscribed public memory in order to shape perceptions has been used 
throughout post-conflict societies all over the world. For example, after the deadly 
Chechen War in Russia from 1994-1996, public memory of the war’s atrocities became a 
tool for political power: “The right to memory was transformed into the ‘right to justice’ 
and the ‘never again’ rhetoric was used by the separatist faction within the Chechen 
nationalist movement to defend its yet contested political project” (Campana 141). In this 
case, politicians used negative public memory of the war by making it part of their 
campaigns in order to gain followers. Further, in Tours of Vietnam: War, Travel Guides, 
and Memory, the author argues that after the Vietnam War, American guidebooks of 
Vietnam “repeatedly represented events in ways that favor the global ambitions of the 
United States” (Laderman 94). While the Vietnam War happened on Vietnamese soil, 
Americans were able to influence the creation of public memory through travel books for 
tourists who would be visiting Vietnam so they could deepen American nationalism and 
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imperialism. These examples prove that public memory is intentionally created to make 
the audience-- whoever that may be-- perceive events in the way that the maker wants 
them to, which can have important, lasting social and political effects on society.
 Two of the most striking displays of public memory that I encountered in Chile 
were a brand new, state-of-the art museum called the Museum of Human Rights 
Memory1 and a photo that I came across in an exhibit within a small history museum 
called Londrés 38. The Memory Museum had three floors that walked its guests through 
exhibits representing the years from approximately 1970 to 1990, recounting the coup 
d’état, the political atmosphere during the regime, personal accounts of human rights 
abuses, and the plebiscite that ended the dictatorship.  At the end of the tour, there was a 
glass room illuminated by electric candles that looked upon an enormous blue wall 
featuring a framed, black-and-white photograph of every single person who was killed or 
tortured by the Chilean government. The room had an interactive map, where viewers 
could search for names, click on pictures, and learn the stories of each person on the wall, 
making the museum incredibly intimate and personalized. It was emotionally 
overwhelming to experience as an American, so I cannot imagine how it would feel to see 
it as a Chilean. However, from personal conversations I had about the museum with 
friends, professors, and my host family, there were some who were not interested in 
going, some who insisted how important it was to experience, and some who told me 
they would never go. 
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1 Museo de la Memoria de los Derechos Humanos 
Museo de la Memoria’s wall of faces
Photo by SaladeHistoria via FlickRiver.com
 The other artifact that struck me in my time abroad was a photograph I found in 
an exhibit within a small history museum in Santiago. The museum was called Londrés 
38, named after its street address. It was a small, unmarked house-- practically invisible 
in an affluent neighborhood in the heart of Santiago, but it had a very dark past: It was 
one of the many offices where Chilean dissidents were interrogated, tortured, and 
ultimately disappeared by the government. The house was empty; they left no torture 
tools, no pictures on the walls, nothing. There were just facts written on a few of the 
walls.
11
Words above the fireplace at Londrés 38
Photo by author
 This was the only picture I got of some of the writing-- It was in the first room of 
the house, and after that, it felt disrespectful to take photographs. Below are the picture I 
took of the writing as well as its translation:
“This place, right in the middle of Santiago, functioned as the detention, 
torture, and extermination center known as Londrés 38. From here began 
forced disappearances as a systematic practice of terrorism by the State 
imposed in Chile in September of 1973.
A number of people not yet determined were detained here, and as far as 
can be established, 96 prisoners were either executed, forced to disappear, 
or died afterwards as a consequence of the torture; of them, 83 men and 13 
women, two of the women pregnant. The majority were young militants, 
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primarily  from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the Communist 
Party and the Socialist Party.
Before the denunciation of these crimes, and as a form of concealment, the 
dictator substituted the number 38 for the number 40, which still existed 
until recently.
If not for the action of the ex-detained, relatives of the victims and social 
organizations, this center would still be ignored. Virtually  “erased” from 
the city.”2
  A guide solemnly explained to me and a group of foreign students the human 
rights abuses that had taken place here, along with the historical context. He told us that 
leaving the house empty was intentional-- we were supposed to make up our own minds 
about what happened there, and about how we wanted to remember it. While this was all 
very moving, what I found curious was that on the top floor, one empty room was 
dedicated to the student movement for education reform. There were professional 
photographs displayed neatly through the room, each telling a story about the protests. 
One that I found particularly interesting was of a man in the middle of a protest, holding 
up a sign that read, “Pinochet: May your legacy die!”3 
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2 En este lugar, en pleno centro de Santiago, funcionó el recinto de detención, tortura y exterminio conocido 
como Londrés 38. Desde aquí se dio inicio a la desaparición forzada, como práctica sistemática del 
terrorismo de Estado impuesto en Chile, en septiembre de 1973.
Un número aún no determinado de personas permaneció detenido aquí y, hasta donde se ha podido 
establecer, 96 prisioneros fueron ejecutados, hechos desaparecer o murieron posteriormente a consecuencia 
de las torturas; entre ellos 83 hombres y 13 mujeres, dos de ellas embarazadas. En su mayoría eran jóvenes 
militantes, principalmente del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), del Partido Comunista y del 
Partido Socialista.
Ante la denuncia de estos crímenes, y como forma de ocultamiento, la dictadura sustituyó el número 38 por 
el 40, el que hace poco aún permanecía.
De no haber sido por la acción de los ex detenidos, familiares de las víctimas y organizaciones sociales, 
este recinto aún permanecería ignorado. Virtualmente “borrado” de la ciudad.
3 “Pinochet: ¡Que muera tu herencia!”
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Photo of a protest sign in Londrés 38
Photo by author
 To me, seeing this photograph within the torture house meant that, at least to the 
organization who runs Londrés 38, there is a direct connection between the dark past of 
the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 80s and the education movement of today. This 
could be because of the significant amount of students who were victims of human rights 
abuses during the Pinochet regime, and it could also be because Pinochet’s policies still 
have a grip on the education system. Either way, the fact that an art exhibit about current 
education protests was intentionally placed inside of a museum about torture during the 
Pinochet regime demonstrates a compelling link between two of Chile’s most important 
moments in history, and it was what sparked my interest in exploring how Chileans are 
currently forming their own public memory of the Pinochet regime and how that is linked 
to today’s student protests.
Research Question and Hypothesis
  My goal is to explore what kind of relationship the education movement has with 
the formation of public memory about the dictatorship, and further, what role young 
Chileans play in said formation. In order to do this, I must also find out if there is a 
correlation between approval of Pinochet and age (to see if changes in perception are 
generational), if those perceptions affect opinions on current political movements like 
educational reform, and what that means for Chilean society. I have chosen to focus on 
generation instead of any other category of identity because of the varying relationships 
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each age category has with the dictatorship: Chileans older than 50 grew up under his 
regime, experiencing the best and the worst of his ways-- Pinochet saved Chile’s 
economy both after he took office and during the 1980s while the rest of Latin America 
was experiencing the Lost Decade, but tortured and killed thousands of Chileans in the 
process. Meanwhile, people from approximately 25-50 years of age remember the 
regime, but in different ways: They were young when it happened-- maybe too young to 
understand his economic policies and more removed from the human rights abuses than 
their parents. Lastly, there is the generation of Chileans under 25-- namely college 
students, for the purpose of my research-- who are the first generation to have no memory 
of the dictatorship whatsoever, meaning that their perception of him is created mainly by 
what their elders tell them and public memory rather than personal experience. Because 
younger generations of any democratic society tend to hold much political sway and have 
a direct influence on the future of their societies, it is important to investigate exactly how 
the upcoming generation of post-dictatorship Chileans feel about their past, and in turn, 
their future.
 Therefore, I predict that there is indeed a correlation between approval of 
Pinochet and age. I think that the youngest generation will have a highly negative 
perception of the Pinochet regime, as they are the most open about political reform and 
are the most removed from the dictatorship. However, they have no memory of the 
atrocities that happened during his regime and have only been alive while Chile was 
prospering from the relatively untouched architecture of his policies, making their stance 
more ambivalent. I believe that the middle generation will be even more negative in their 
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beliefs about Pinochet because they may have actual memory of the regime and can thus 
recall the atrocities for themselves, perhaps even knowing some of the victims who may 
be parents or other older loved ones. Furthermore, I predict that because older-generation 
Chileans were old enough to experience the emotional trauma of the human rights abuses 
and social stratification of Pinochet’s dictatorship, yet also witnessed his policies save 
their economy, they will have a much more nuanced perception of Pinochet’s regime. 
Methodology
  The first thing I did in order to test my hypothesis was administer surveys to 
Chileans via Facebook and email regarding their opinions on Pinochet, the education 
protests, and public memory. I administered the surveys through Facebook and email so 
that I could reach all age groups. I also interpreted already-existing Chilean data about 
current perceptions of Pinochet to further my analysis of the surveys. I additionally 
examined trends in popular culture since Chile’s transition to democracy through films, 
music, and media to see what kind of public memory is being formed surrounding the 
legacy of Pinochet, and by whom.  
Upcoming Chapters
 In Chapter Two, I will present a history of Chile since 1970 by looking into the 
policies and politics of Salvador Allende, Augusto Pinochet, and following presidents. In 
Chapter Three, I will give an in-depth account of the education system and the student 
protests, as well as a snapshot of current politics in the country. In Chapter Four, I will 
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present my findings about the creation of public memory within Chile by looking at 
music, art, film, and so on. In Chapter Five, I will present the findings of my surveys in 
order to answer my research question about the relationship between Pinochet, the 
education movement, and age. In Chapter Six, I will discuss how those two are related, 
place my findings in the larger context of Latin America, and present my conclusions.
18
CHAPTER TWO: A Brief History of Chile
From Socialism to Authoritarianism: 1970-1990
 Elected in 1970 as a member of the Socialist Party, which was a part of the 
Unidad Popular (UP) coalition, Socialist President Salvador Allende faced challenges to 
his presidency from before he stepped into office until the day he was overthrown. 
Having run for president four times before winning, he only narrowly secured the 
nomination of the Socialist Party, and only won with 36 percent of the vote. While he did 
make reforms like giving every child free milk, his promises to “nationalize the economy, 
implement a massive program of income redistribution, end the dominance of the 
latifundia, transform the political system through the creation of a unicameral 
legislature,” and so on, were almost always restricted by both the opposition he faced and 
the lack of organization and support within his own party (Bethell 158).
  Lasting only three years, his presidency was marred with an economic recession, 
internal factionalization, and political violence. In Allende’s first year as president, 
Chile’s GDP grew in 1971 by 7.7% overall and unemployment fell from 8.3% to 3.8% 
(Bethell 161). While this was great for his presidency, the economic boom was short-
lived: The price of copper-- Chile’s most important raw export-- fell significantly in 
1971, and the trade balance turned from a US $95 million surplus in 1970 to a deficit of 
$90 million in 1971, which was a serious blow to his presidency. Further, Chile’s other 
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economic problems, like “breakdowns in the distribution system, industrial conflict, the 
growth of a black market, the decline in private investment, [and] uncontrolled monetary 
expansion” all multiplied in 1972 and 1973, which were all serious blows to his 
credibility (Bethell 163). While Allende was very successful in decreasing income 
disparity, nationalizing copper mines, and accelerating land reform, the aforementioned 
external factors were enough for Allende to lose a significant portion of his popularity. 
 Chile’s increasing economic turmoil only furthered the polarization of those 
within government. Members of his own Socialist Party declared that “revolutionary 
violence [was] inevitable and necessary,” essentially endorsing violence in the name of 
Socialism, which “embarrassed the Allende government and gave an opportunity to the 
Right to create fears about the intentions of the UP as a whole” (Bethell 159). On top of 
that, the opposition obtained the majority in house, causing the political center to 
essentially disappear; and Allende’s “own moderation made [him] increasingly isolated as 
his supporters developed new forms of political organization outside the control of the 
executive” (Bethell 167). Many Chileans felt that the government had lost control, so 
political violence rose among citizens in both rural and urban areas. For example, after a 
proposal to increase state control over supplies to the trucking companies in October 
1972, workers “virtually paralyzed” the transport sector by having “powerful” solidarity 
strikes that sparked military intervention (Bethell 174). 
 The military felt threatened by the Allende government for multiple reasons. 
Because worker uprisings like this were not uncommon during Allende’s presidency, the 
military had to frequently become involved in order to keep the peace, which created 
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resentment between them and the UP government. Additionally, Latin American 
revolutionaries like Castro established relationships with Allende and began making 
extended visits Chile to share ideas, which sparked rumors that there might be an armed 
revolution like ones that Castro had led. Obviously, the military was opposed to this 
notion, as political violence was already surging within the country and they were bearing 
the brunt of trying to keep the peace. The army even resented Allende’s personal 
bodyguards called the Group of Friends of the President, who were from the extreme left 
wing of the UP. Throughout Allende’s presidency, the Right constantly called on the 
military to hold a coup, and eventually, the military became involved even though they 
previously “had intervened only intermittently in the political process” (Bethell 175). 
When the military entered the cabinet to oversee the March 1973 elections and there were 
inconclusive results, the politicians of the Right convinced the military that the only 
solution was to hold a coup d’état to get rid of Allende, who was, in their eyes, destroying 
the peace and prosperity of their country. 
 Therefore, on September 11, 1973, there was a military coup to overthrow the 
Allende government, placing the military general Augusto Pinochet into power as a 
dictator. The coup was “warmly embraced” by the United States (who had tried and failed 
to organize a military coup three years earlier) because Allende’s presidency was 
perceived as a threat to democracy; the coup was also embraced by the Chilean elite, who 
believed Allende’s policies were economically destroying the country, and in turn, their 
wealth (Dinges 3). Tanks and soldiers stormed the capital building, La Moneda, and when 
Allende realized what was happening, he killed himself in his office rather than surrender 
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to the military. The next day, General Augusto Pinochet was placed at the head of the 
military junta, thus becoming the dictator of Chile for the next 17 years.
 One of the first things Pinochet did upon becoming president was drastically 
change Chilean fiscal policy in order to recuperate the economy that fell apart during 
Allende’s term. With the help of the Chicago Boys, a group of young Chilean economists 
educated at the University of Chile and the University of Chicago, Pinochet created a 
fiscal policy that was based on the belief that “private forces should guide economic and 
social activities, not the state,” widely referred to as neoliberalism, which ultimately 
placed the majority of the country’s wealth into the pockets of a small elite (Hecht 139). 
In the first years of Pinochet’s regime, for example, the military government began 
selling enterprises that had been under Allende’s state control, and the only people who 
were already wealthy could afford to buy them. By 1979, “135 of the 250 largest private 
enterprises were under the control of the ten largest financial conglomerates” (Hecht 
144).  Banks were also privatized, which facilitated the growing concentration of wealth 
because the conglomerates could “acquire enterprises through leveraged buyouts 
financed by the banks, which had, in turn, borrowed the money from private foreign 
banks” (Hecht 144).  Not only did this lead to a burgeoning amount of foreign debt, but it 
also meant that a very small group of people held incredible amounts of power.  As for 
the majority of Chileans who could not afford to buy privatized enterprises or stock, real 
wages fell steadily and income distribution worsened.  Not only this, but because the 
Chicago Boys-- who were educated under the Milton Friedman, the father of 
conservative economic practices-- believed that the free market approach should be 
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applied not only economically, but socially as well, social services were also privatized. 
This included health care, education, and the pension system. Ultimately, these reforms 
made it so that the level of quality in a person’s education, access to medical services, and 
social security became directly correlated to the amount of money he or she was able to 
pay. This created a vast difference in quality of life between the rich and poor since only 
the rich had access to quality health care and education (Hecht 151). 
 Throughout the 1900s, Latin American countries’ economies were largely based 
on raw materials, meaning that other countries were producing these materials and selling 
finished products back to them. While exporting said raw materials was good for the 
economy in that it kept people employed, peripheral countries like those of Latin America 
ultimately began falling into serious debt. In 1982, the president of Mexico declared that 
it would be unable to pay back its debts, sparking the worst recession Latin America had 
seen since the Great Depression, throwing essentially every Latin American country into 
economic disarray (Alcántara, Paramio, Freidenberg and Déniz 11). The crisis obviously 
posed a threat to Pinochet’s regime, but “economic recuperation and greater attention to 
the economic interests that were the core’s support, coupled with Pinochet’s political 
intransigence and the continued use of repression” prevented a transition of power once 
the economy crashed (Hecht 143). And, because the grand majority of Chile’s goods had 
been privatized, unlike the rest of Latin America whose goods were national, Chile 
survived the Lost Decade practically unscathed. Surviving the recession of the Lost 
Decade along with how quickly he recuperated the economy after the Allende presidency 
played a large part of Pinochet’s popularity and endurance as dictator over 17 years.
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  However, it is important to mention the unthinkable human rights abuses that 
happened during his regime. Operation Condor, led by Pinochet from 1973 to 1980, was 
an international operation to stop communism by way of torture and assassination. 
Countries in the Southern Cone-- Chile, Argentina and Uruguay-- were all involved, and 
were supported by the United States; the goal was to “eradicate all traces of political 
movements akin to Allende’s-- in all of Latin America” in order to stop the spread of 
communism (Dinges 3). Political dissidents (i.e., Allende’s supporters and anyone who 
identified as a leftist) were kidnapped, brought to detention centers, and were tortured or 
killed by the government in a way that was a “very intense and relatively 
undiscriminating use of violent repression” (Roniger and Sznajder 21). As mentioned by 
the photo of Londrés 38 in Chapter One, many of the victims were members of MIR, a 
Leftist organization, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Party-- but they were not the 
only ones affected. Below are some demographics on torture victims:
Table 2.1: Victim Classification
Occupation Percentage of Victims
Working Class 30.1
Student 14.2
Professional 11.6
Self-employed/misc. 25.5
Armed Forces 5.8
Table 2.2: Victims by Age
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Age Range Percentage of Victims
Below 16 2.1
16-25 36.2
26-35 35
36-45 13.9
Over 46 9.4
Unknown 3.4
Source: US Institute of Peace
 As made evident by the charts, no type of person was spared: There were students, 
housewives, elderly people, and even members of the armed forces who were subject to 
unspeakable violence. One torture victim who was a member of the Socialist Party, 
Leopoldo García Lucero, shared his story with the Guardian shortly after the 40th 
anniversary of the coup:
I was repeatedly tortured for months, first in the basement of a police 
station, and then in the national stadium, which the military regime had 
turned into a large concentration camp for political prisoners. I was 
blindfolded and handcuffed for most of the torture, so I couldn't see my 
torturers. 
I was beaten on my head and body countless times; they broke my arm in 
several places after smashing it with a rifle and I almost lost an eye; they 
held my head under cold water and electrocuted me; they kicked me in my 
testicles, burned me with cigarettes and suspended me by a hook with 
weights on my legs. I heard of people being executed by firing squads.
At the police station, there were bags of concrete covered in blood. The 
police interrogated me about the whereabouts of politicians close to 
Allende; I wouldn't give them any information. They threatened to kill my 
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six-year-old daughter. They said they would shoot her in front of the 
concrete bags, and then do the same to me.
I didn't know if my family  members were dead or alive for eight months. I 
spent almost two years in several concentration camps. In June 1975, I 
was expelled from Chile by a government decree. I received refugee status 
in the UK, and my wife and three daughters joined me in exile. (Lucero 1)
 Stories like Leopoldo’s are not uncommon. In 2011, the Valech Commission 
reported that the newest total number of people who had been held as political prisoners 
and tortured is 40,018 and the official number of those killed or forcibly disappeared is 
now 3,065, while the unofficial numbers are probably much higher (Long 1). It is evident 
from the tables above that many of the victims were young people-- typically students or 
workers. Currently, anyone over just 25 years old was alive during his regime, and 
therefore the memories of human rights violations like his are still fresh for many 
Chileans. 
  By the late 1980’s, word had gotten out about the human rights abuses of the 
Pinochet regime, so democratic countries and international human rights organizations 
like Amnesty International began placing pressure on Chile to hold a plebiscite with the 
hopes that Chileans would vote him out of office. After Pinochet was reelected in 1986 in 
a similar plebiscite, forces to get him out of office strengthened. In 1988, 55% of the 
population voted no, ending 17 years of authoritarian rule and finally commencing the 
democracy Chile enjoys today.
Chile in Democracy: 1990 to Today
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 One of the conditions of the plebiscite was that if voted out of office, Pinochet 
would have two years to transition out. Therefore, in his final two years, he reformed the 
constitution that he created in 1980 and constructed the binomial system under which 
Chile governs itself today, which has created significant problems in Chilean politics. In 
most countries in the world, a country is divided into districts, and each district has one 
representative. This is not the case in Chile, where each district has two representatives, 
and both seats are up for grabs by either party. In order for a party to take both seats in a 
district, it must “gain more than twice the votes of the next most voted list,” which makes 
it almost impossible for any one party to gain dominance (Angell 284). Because of this, 
even if a party has a large following and high popular legitimacy, this same dominance is 
not translated into the legislature. Because of this imbalance, parties have been forced to 
band together for support and success. Though there are many parties within the country, 
these parties have coalesced into two major blocs. These two blocs are known as the 
Alianza, a center-right coalition, and the Concertación, a center-left coalition. While this 
appears similar to the American two-party system, it creates less fair representation for 
smaller parties within the coalitions. This system makes little sense for a democratic 
society where all citizens are free to identify with whatever party they wish, but 
Pinochet’s constitution reformers created a system that “overrepresent[ed] parties of the 
Right and reduc[ed] the number of significant parties in the country” (Siavelis 58). This 
fit perfectly into Pinochet’s goal to cripple the strength and number of all political parties, 
since he was not affiliated with any one party himself. This electoral system profoundly 
shapes party interactions in the country, and the central question scholars struggle over 
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today concerns how “the coalitions have held together for so long” (Angell 285). Instead 
of creating a healthy party system that expresses the needs of the people, the electoral 
system has “consistently proven to be a stumbling block” in Chilean politics, and former 
President Ricardo Lagos even said that it would be “the death of [Chile’s] democratic 
system” (Pastor 56). In terms of popular protests, this means that an entire coalition 
would have to be convinced that change is needed in order for protestors’ demands to be 
met.
 Despite the political system, Chile is still relatively politically stable. In fact, 
when compared to other countries on the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index in terms of 
democratic stability, Chile has a score of 42, a “stable” status in terms of their democracy 
(Failed States Index 2013). The index measures factors such as economic decline, human 
flight, delegitimization of the state, human rights abuses, education, and public services. 
However, Chile is less stable than it was in 2006, before any of the student protests 
began: It scored a 32, and its score has been declining ever since. However, when 
comparing Chile to the rest of the world, a score of 42 is still very high, meaning that 
overall, Chile has a very stable democracy.
 Chile’s success as a politically stable country is, at least in part, due to the fact 
that when Chile transitioned into democracy, the Concertación Coalition, who held the 
power at the time, decided to make minimal changes to the policies already in place. This 
was because they did not want to make any drastic changes for fear that the military 
might see reason to intervene (Hecht 172). Therefore, the Constitution made in 1980 by 
Pinochet himself was kept in place, and the unfair binomial system was kept in place and 
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has yet to be changed (Siavelis 58). In other words, Pinochet’s grip on how Chile 
functions politically and economically is still as tight as ever.
 Before discussing what the Pinochet’s neoliberal legacy looks like within the 
education system, though, it is important to frame where Chile lies within the rest of 
Latin America in terms of social problems. With a human development index of roughly 
0.8, Chile is among the most “developed” countries in Latin America (International 
Human Development Indicators: Chile 2013). Furthermore, statistics show that Chile is 
doing better than not only just Latin America, but than the world average. According to 
the Human Development Index, Chile ranks at a .819, while the rest of Latin America 
ranks at .741 and the world average is .694 (International Human Development 
Indicators: Chile 2013). And because “very high human development” ranks at .905, 
which factors in health, education, income, gender inequality, poverty, and so on, Chile is 
indisputably a socially developed country. This does not mean that Chile is without 
significant social problems, though.
At the end of the Pinochet regime in 1990, Chile had a GINI index of 0.58, where 
0 is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. Since then, the GINI index has fluctuated 
some, but mostly remained between 0.57 and 0.58. As of 2012, it was only slightly better, 
scoring at 0.52-- On par with the rest of Latin America (World Bank Database 1). 
Additionally, the top ten percent of Chileans currently possess roughly 40% of the total 
income in the country, and this unequal distribution has not gotten any better since the 
fall of the Pinochet regime (Hecht 196). When comparing these statistics to the ones 
above, it is clear that while Chile can be considered a socially developed country overall, 
29
the country still has significant issues with inequality (not unlike the United States, for 
example). But ultimately, these statistics indicate that the unequal socio-economic 
hierarchy that Pinochet created with his policies has largely remained in place, and 
economic inequality is a pressing problem within the country. This is especially evident 
when examining the country’s education system, which I will discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE: Education and Protest
Chilean Education System
 Before the dictatorship, Chile’s education system operated under the ideology of 
estado docente, a teaching State, which meant that education was completely centralized: 
In the late 1960s, primary education had been “practically universalized,” meaning it 
either free or very cheap for students throughout the country (Delannoy 7). While Allende 
was president, he sought to broaden educational opportunities and align them with 
Marxist ideology, specifically by planning a revolution. However, Allende never achieved 
this revolution-- or any sort of educational reform during his term-- due to all of his 
administration’s aforementioned hardships.
 However, after the coup d’état, the military government flipped estado docente on 
its head by introducing a subsidiary role of government, meaning “the rights of private 
agents ought to supersede the state’s prerogatives whenever possible,” which obviously 
hand-in-hand with Pinochet and the Chicago Boys’ neoliberal ideology (Delannoy 8).  
Specifically, the subsidiary education plan sought to “promote greater efficiency through 
administrative decentralization, capitation-based financing, labor regulation and open 
competition between public and privately administered schools” (Delannoy 1). This 
meant that teachers were subject to private sector labor laws which allowed for local 
determination of wages, schools were financed based on average monthly student 
31
attendance, and parents had the choice to send their children to private schools if they 
could pay, essentially privatizing everything. While the administration was successful in 
completely privatizing the education system, it came at a price: overall quality of 
education decreased drastically, and the poor were the hardest hit. Various evaluations 
conducted in 1990 reflected that “40 percent of 4th graders in the poorest half of the 
population could not understand what they were reading. . . [and] net secondary 
enrollment ratios were 97.6 percent for the richest quintile, but only 73.6 percent for the 
poorest quintile” (Delannoy 12). Today, vast economic inequality within the education 
system still exists.
 When a student enters school at age six, his/her parents are allowed to choose 
which kind of school they would like their child to attend: municipal, state-funded (which 
includes training schools like Professional Institutes (IPs) and Centers of Technical 
Formation (CFTs)), or private. Municipal schools are funded by the municipalities 
themselves; state-funded schools charge, but are less expensive than private schools.  It is 
generally acknowledged that the private schools are attended by the rich, state-funded 
schools by the middle class, and municipal schools by the poorer students (Tertiary 
Education in Chile 26). The graph below illustrates this trend:
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Source: Kathy Trabue via CNED Database
 In order to enroll in any tertiary institution, students must take the standardized 
admission exam called  Prueba de Selección Universitária (PSU), much like the SAT in 
the United States, which is the most important factor-- if not the only factor-- considered 
for admission. In order to do well on the PSU, many well-to-do students choose to enroll 
in pre-university schools after graduating high school in order to train for the test. While 
private schools can normally successfully get through their curriculum before the school 
year is over, leaving extra time for PSU training, municipal schools are typically unable 
to sufficiently complete their curriculum by the end of the year, leaving less time for PSU 
training. (This is reminiscent of state testing within the United States: More affluent 
schools tend to do better on state tests because their teachers can more effectively teach 
the curriculum and so they have more time to train students to take the test, whereas less 
affluent schools do not have this advantage (Mackenzie 7).) One option for students to 
make better scores on the test is to enroll in a year-long PSU training school, called a pre-
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universitaria. However, it is not funded by municipalities or the state, meaning that 
students who go to the lower-performing municipal schools likely cannot afford to enroll. 
In the graph below, it is clear how much better students who go to private schools 
perform on the PSU than those who go to municipal schools:
Source: Kathy Trabue via DEMRE
 There are two types of universities that students can attend: Traditional and non-
traditional. Traditional universities like the Catholic University of Chile and the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile are members of the Council of Rectors of Chilean 
Universities (CRUCH), which are state-funded, while non-traditional schools are private. 
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(The university I attended was a CRUCH school.)  CRUCH schools are historically 
funded by the Catholic Church, but were privatized by the military government in 1981. 
After 1990, the Concertación administration began partially funding them and allowed 
for the creation of other private schools, but they are still more expensive than other 
private universities. Today, CRUCH schools carry more prestige and are more selective 
even though private and non-traditional schools offer the same types of degrees and are 
roughly the same price. Below is a graph of prices for private and CRUCH schools versus 
technical schools4:
Source: Kathy Trabue via CNED Database
Interestingly, CRUCH schools also provide more access to funding for students, 
yet cost about the same as non-traditional schools. According to the OECD, 
the publicly-financed student support  system consists of a number of 
different loan and scholarship schemes… Though many of these schemes 
are targeted specifically at young people from poorer households, their 
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4 There are roughly 500 CLP to 1 USD.
PSU-dependency limits the numbers they can help. Secondly, most  of the 
schemes appear to have been designed with CRUCH institutions in mind, 
and students at private universities, IPs and CFTs – two-thirds of tertiary 
students– are far less likely to be eligible for them. (Tertiary  Education in 
Chile 43)
 
In other words, CRUCH schools offer more scholarships for students who are more 
competitive-- meaning students who are wealthier-- than for the students who choose to 
go to non-traditional schools or IPs and CFTs, which are attended by people with less 
money than those who would attend CRUCH schools yet offer the same types of degrees. 
In fact, in 2008, almost eighty percent of government-funded scholarship money went to 
students attending CRUCH schools (Trabue 49).  
  One would assume that since the transition to democracy, politicians would have 
swiftly changed this structure, as its faults were evident and it was so directly related with 
the dictatorship. However, on his last day in office, March 10, 1990, Pinochet passed a 
Constitutional Law on Education (LOCE), which was designed to “lock up” the 
aforementioned education reforms by “making any amendment subject to a political 
quorum, which was and remains largely unattainable” (Delannoy 13). While LOCE 
served to perpetuate the neoliberal model within the education system, many people 
believed that it was a “model for post-welfare reforms,” and so reversing them would 
have required a “sustained and and difficult political fight with the opposition that the 
Concertación would not want to risk” in such a fragile political state (Gauri 88). As 
aforementioned, the Concertación coalition, while left-leaning, has kept many neoliberal 
reforms in place, and LOCE was no different. It was not until massive student-led 
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protests in 2006 when students demanded change that LOCE would finally come to an 
end. 
 Student Protests
 In a broader context, protests have proven to be a legitimate and effective way to 
create change throughout Latin America. Due to rapid urbanization and democratization 
within the last hundred years, some Latin American cities have turned into segregated 
centers of rich and poor. In places like São Paulo, the poor have begun to do something 
about it in what is known as insurgent citizenship. According to the anthropologist who 
coined the term, James Holston, “city people live in impoverished urban peripheries in 
various conditions of illegal and irregular residence, around urban centers that benefit 
from their services and their poverty. . . Precisely in these peripheries, residents organize 
movements of insurgent citizenship to confront the entrenched regimes of citizen 
inequality that the urban centers use to segregate them” (Holston 245). Movements of 
insurgent citizenship can have the goal of gaining the “right to reside with dignity, 
security, and mobility,” and often take the form of protests and violence (Holston 248). 
The people living in the favelas of São Paulo have seen significant gains in rights since 
they began to use violence as a means of voicing their needs, and large cities in Chile like 
Santiago and Valparaíso are no different: Citizens are using violence and protests in order 
to create important and necessary social change. 
 Some of the more well-known protests in Chile include the 2011 peaceful protests 
where the indigenous Mapuches of Patagonia rode into Punta Arenas on horseback to 
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object the construction of a dam in Patagonia which would destroy their livelihoods (and, 
not to mention, the environment, which was protested by people in Santiago that year as 
well), and of course, the 2011 student protests, which were particularly violent. In these 
instances, insurgent citizenship was practiced in that marginalized groups like the 
Mapuches and students came together in a public setting to voice their demands. 
However, protests have become such an effective manner of communicating that it is not 
just marginalized groups protesting, but rather, Chileans of different socio-economic 
groups have come together in solidarity. In my four months in Chile alone, I witnessed 
countless protests for a plethora of different causes, ranging from workers rights on Labor 
Day to the legalization of marijuana, from LGBT rights to the objection of a mall that is 
to be built in a historic part of Valparaíso; each protest included people from many 
different socio-economic groups. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that the CRUCH 
university I attended shut down: Even though I went to a traditionally rich school with 
privileged students who didn’t necessarily need free education or more state funding to 
attend a good university, the students still voted for their school to go en paro. Because 
rich students would have no other incentive to vote this way as they are the ones 
receiving all the benefits of this unequal system, voting to go en paro was likely just so 
that their poorer counterparts might have the opportunity to attend better schools, which 
is an impressive and important act of solidarity. 
 June 2006 marked the first major student protest in the country and the largest in 
Chile’s history up to that point, with over a million students rioting for over ten hours in 
Santiago (Franklin 1). Concerns about the education system had been voiced since the 
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transition to democracy, but a new fee for the PSU and rumors that public transportation 
benefits for students would be cut off sent students to the streets to protest. Students 
demanded that they receive free public transportation to and from school, waivers for the 
fee to take the PSU, the placement of students on the presidential advisory committee, the 
end of LOCE, and ultimately, quality education for all (Riesco 244). The protest, which 
became known as the March of the Penguins (in reference to the black and white student 
uniforms everyone wore) was largely successful in that LOCE was abolished and was 
replaced with the General Law of Education5 which limits the authority that universities 
have from discriminating against students for economic reasons, but the demand for 
better education for everyone was still not met. 
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5 Ley General de Educación
  
Students rioting in front of PUCV in Valparaiso 
Photo by Eliseo Fernandez
! In 2011, student protests escalated to an extent that was more organized and more 
violent than in 2006. Some people I spoke with in Chile believed that the students who 
led the 2006 secondary school-oriented protests were the same people who led the 2011 
university-oriented protests, but others claimed that the rise in massive protests in 2011 
were inspired by similar student protests in Spain as well as the Arab Spring-- the reason 
protests escalated in 2011 is likely a combination of the two. Either way, there were 
countless, massive protests throughout the country that quickly became violent among 
both protesters and the police: One student, Manuel Gutiérrez Reinoso, was shot and 
killed by the police (Chilean president seeks answers on protest death 1). The Atlantic 
created a photo album to capture the essence of the protests. The photo above in 
particular caught my attention, not only because of its location (directly in front of my 
university, PUCV), but because of the students wearing gas masks and throwing stones at 
what is most certainly the police.
 While there was lots of violence involved in the 2011 protests, as this photograph 
effectively displays, the student movement did not lack organization. Prominent leaders 
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such as Giorgio Jackson, president of a prominent organization called the Federation of 
Students of the University of Chile (FEUC) that organizes and mobilizes students at the 
University of Chile, and Camila Vallejo, president of a similar organization for students at 
multiple universities called the Federation of Chilean Students (FECh), quickly became 
prominent leaders and spokespeople for the student protests. Together, they also led an 
even broader, more mobile organization called CONFECH, the Confederation of Chilean 
Students,6 which published a definitive list of demands in July of 2011. The list included 
sweeping educational reform, not only for tertiary education but for primary and 
secondary as well. Some of the demands included constitutional reform, less emphasis on 
the PSU for university admission, increased state support for public universities, 
dismunicipalization of public schools, free public transport for students, a new system for 
scholarships and student financing, student participation in university governance, a new 
system for accreditation, and increased state support for public universities (Bases para 
un acuerdo social por la educación chilena 1). On the first of August, the then-president 
Sebastián Piñera responded with a proposal that would increase scholarships and allow 
student participation in university governance, but would still allow for schools to be for-
profit (Salazar 1). Unsurprisingly, CONFECH rejected his proposal, and through 
Facebook, Twitter, its blog, and flyers and posters in universities, it organized massive 
protests throughout the country for August 5th (Franklin 1).
 Because of protests like that, which have been happening semi-consistently from 
2011 until today, reforms like waived entrance exam fees, reduced-cost student 
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6 Confederación de Estudiantes de Chile
transportation, and even a replacement of LOCE have been implemented, which 
abolished for-profit schools (Setterfield 1). In other words, the protests have made 
significant progress in changing the education system. However, many critics argue that 
this progress is not long-term enough: reforms made only put a bandaid on the bullet 
hole, and LOCE’s replacement has been essentially useless because it has done so little to 
constrain market forces. However, in June of 2013, Bachelet, who was running for 
reelection at the time, promised that if she were president, she would make education free 
for all within six years (Ahumada 1). This is a significantly different stance on education, 
considering she did relatively little when she was president in 2006. I even remember 
graffiti outside of PUCV that said that voting for Bachelet would be like returning to an 
ex-partner after he or she had cheated, but with much more graphic vocabulary. However, 
her 2013 election platform was to establish education as a “social right,” creating 
“explicit guarantees to access, quality, and financing,” and she was indeed reelected 
(Arzola 1). If she will follow through with promise, though, is something that has yet to 
unfold.
2013 Presidential Elections
 In the 2013 elections, Michele Bachelet of the Nueva Mayoría Coalition (formerly 
Concertación-- it now includes the Communist Party) and Evelyn Matthei of the Alianza 
Coalition faced a runoff as neither candidate gained over 50% of the vote in the general 
elections, which is necessary to win the presidency. Bachelet gained 47% of the vote 
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while Matthei only gained 25%, and in the runoff, Bachelet won with 62.3% of the vote 
(Presidency Postponed 1). 
 This election demonstrated an interesting dialogue between the past and present in 
terms of politics. In a survey done by the Center for Public Studies in September 2013, 
people associated Michelle Bachelet with the left and Matthei very much to the right 
(Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública 93). Interestingly, each candidate had a powerful 
connection with the Pinochet dictatorship: Bachelet herself was interrogated and tortured 
by the Pinochet government because she was a Socialist (and still is), while Matthei’s 
father was a military general during the dictatorship (Modiano 1). This information, while 
not the most important aspect of the election, was widely discussed in various media 
outlets as well as among my Chileans friends and host family, and everyone discussed 
how their personal histories represent how much the politics of the dictatorship is still 
prevalent in Chilean politics. Because of the certain parallel between the politics of 1973 
and the 2013 elections, Bachelet’s win was perceived as a metaphorical victory. In this 
case, Allende was ultimately triumphant against Pinochet in the long run, working to end 
Pinochet’s legacy that was called to die in the protest poster I mentioned in the first 
chapter. Themes of metaphorical victory like this are recurrent in the Chilean public; I 
will discuss them further in the chapters to come because they make strong arguments 
that Chileans want to disassociate from Pinochet and what he represents.
Another important aspect of the 2013 presidential election was that some of the 
student movement’s most important student leaders, like Camila Vallejo, Giorgio 
Jackson, Karol Cariola and Gabriel Boric, were all elected to congress. When asked about 
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what she wanted to do in office, Vallejo responded, “We want to interrupt the institution 
in order to change it, because it is antidemocratic in many respects. It has many enclaves 
that have persisted since the military dictatorship until today. The grand majority of 
people understand that Chile has changed. . . And also the more traditional political 
world, that has realized that there is a new political moment that requires structural 
changes7” (Los exlíderes estudiantiles que arrasaron en las elecciones en Chile 1). Some 
of her most important priorities in office include drafting a new constitution, 
strengthening social and worker’s rights, and, of course, reforming education. While 
some Chileans think joining the traditional political realm and teaming up with Bachelet, 
who did little to implement educational reform in her first term, is hypocritical, having 
young people insert themselves into office is an important step for young Chileans to 
actively achieve their political agenda in another way than through simply protest. Again, 
whether or not Vallejo and the other student leaders actually make a difference is a 
question that cannot yet be answered, but their newfound presence in the government is 
an important step for the youngest generation of Chileans, whose ideals will be explored 
further in the following chapters.
44
7 Queremos irrumpir en la institucionalidad para cambiarla, porque es antidemocrática en muchos aspectos. 
Tiene enclaves que persisten desde la dictadura militar hasta el momento. Hay una gran mayoría que 
entendió que Chile cambió. . . También el mundo político más tradicional, que se dio cuenta que hay un 
nuevo momento político que requiere cambios estructurales.
CHAPTER FOUR: Displays of Public Memory in Chile
 Since the transition to democracy and especially within the student movement, 
many Chileans have expressed their feelings about the dictatorship in the form of 
memorials, music, artwork, theater, and public spectacle. As mentioned in the first 
chapter, public memory is a tool that ultimately attempts to mold the future of society by 
making statements about the past; it is a way to understand how a culture attempts to 
understand itself from a historical perspective. People can create public memory to reflect 
upon past events, which will ideally influence those who view it to believe what the 
creators want the viewers to believe about the historical event and be changed by it. 
Therefore, displays of public memory in Chile regarding the dictatorship are extremely 
important because they make a statement about how Chileans envision the past and, in 
turn, the future of Chile. Of course, this is the same goal as the student protesters, who 
want to improve their education system and move past the policies of the dictatorship. 
This becomes even more important when the age of the memory creators is considered: 
Younger people tend to have more sway when making political statements because their 
vote is so important, so if a group of young people unites against something, this will 
make an impact on society and affect its future. Therefore, when one considers that many 
young artists and musicians who have been leaders in the student movement have also 
explored themes of the dictatorship-- and that those two themes tend to run together in 
displays of public memory, as I will explore below-- one can argue that the student 
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protests are just as much about making educational reform as they are about making a 
statement about Chilean history and how they want to redefine it. This is what I will 
investigate in this chapter in order to ultimately understand the relationship between 
public memory, Pinochet, and education reform.
 I must mention that while there are surely hundreds of signs, symbols, songs, 
movies, paintings and so on used during student protests that have pointed blame at 
Pinochet for the problems in today’s education system, I do not have access to more of 
them for obvious reasons. However, the examples given below clearly demonstrate that 
students and leaders of the movement believe that the source of the problem in the 
education system is Pinochet, and are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change how he 
is remembered.
Music
 Music is an invaluable medium for the creation of public memory. According to 
the Ethnomusicology Forum, “Music-making and subsequent recollections of the musical 
experience bridge the divide between individual and collective memory. . . Music is 
valued as an experience that joins individuals with a group. Music as at once the outcome 
of individual creativity and creativity’s grounding as a social act” (Shelemay 22-23). In 
other words, music creates a relationship between listeners and an idea-- in this instance, 
a historical event-- which then makes an impact on the listener’s perspective of that idea. 
Therefore, music is an important tool for group identity formation. In the case of Chile, 
musicians form group identity through songs about both the dictatorship and the student 
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protests, uniting students simultaneously in their discontent for the dictatorship and their 
demand for education reform.
 Ana Tijoux is one of the most up-and-coming Latin American artists from Chile, 
having been nominated for best Latin American rock albums in both 2009 and 2011. Her 
first album, “1977,” and her second album, “La Bala,” both have strong undertones of 
political activism in regards to both the education movement and to the dictatorship. 
According to the Los Angeles Times, who did an interview with the artist, 
“Tijoux's . . ."La Bala" (The Bullet), released in January [2011] in the United States, gave 
a sympathetic shout-out to Chile's recent wave of youth-led street protests demanding 
education reforms and attacking the country's growing gulf between rich and poor. 
‘1977’ alluded to Tijoux's generation of Chileans whose parents had fled the brutal 17-
year regime of Gen. Augusto Pinochet and had gone into European exile”” (Johnson 1). It 
is important to note that Tijoux herself was a refugee in France until the dictatorship 
ended when she was fourteen because her parents were leftist activists. Her experience as 
a young victim of the dictatorship makes her a credible activist, and ultimately enhances 
her clout as a leader in the student movement because rhetoric between the two is so 
intertwined.
  Her most famous song, “Shock,” was released in 2011 at the height of the student 
protests and quickly became the anthem for the student movement. In the song, Tijoux 
addresses a leader, presumably President Piñera, when she says, “Your state of control / 
your corrupt throne of gold / your politics and your wealth.” The chorus of the song is 
essentially a cry to battle, making demands that the “stealing” stops now, which is in 
47
xlvii
obvious reference to the education system as images of the 2011 protests flash during her 
music video. Further, “this condemned economic model from dinosaur times” that she 
critiques is an obvious reference to the Neoliberal economic model that political leaders 
like Piñera, Bachelet, and every democratic president have upheld since the transition to 
democracy, and she also blatantly references the constitution created by Pinochet as one 
of the many problems that should be risen up against. The music video is equally 
polemic: There are images of Chilean leaders contrasted with images of students 
violently protesting. Because the height of its popularity was during the height of the 
protests, this song represented, validated, and encouraged the emotions of the students in 
the education movement, making it one of the most iconic and important songs of the 
year. 
 Most importantly, the platform from which the artist makes her stance is not from 
that of a student-- because she is not one-- but of a Chilean who was victimized by the 
dictatorship. As mentioned above, the title of her whole record, “1977,” is a tribute to 
those who are her age, born in the heat of the dictatorship. Because public memory is 
defined as a way to remember the past in order to make an argument about the present 
and the future, her entire album, her protest song, and ultimately her image, are all a 
display of public memory. Therefore, there is a significant link between her work as a 
leader in the student movement and public memory of the dictatorship that has important 
implications: Because of her platform, high school and college students listen to her 
music as a source of inspiration for their cause, and she is thus inscribing public memory 
onto them about what happened in the past as well as what Chile is today. Tijoux sends 
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the message that Chile has a dark past that needs to be revolutionized.
 While Ana Tijoux is certainly the pronounced artist of the student protests, there 
are other bands that have had an impact on the movement. In the “CultPop” section of El 
Dínamo, an independent Chilean news source, a list of influential songs was published 
that were said to represent the student movement in 2011. While some classic resistance 
songs like “Freedom” by Rage Against the Machine and “Revolution” by the Beatles 
made the list, there were multiple Chilean artists who are most widely known for their 
work during the dictatorship. Víctor Jara, an immortalized Chilean musician from the 
1960’s, is one poignant example: A member of the Communist Party and part of the New 
Chilean Song Movement,8 a musical movement that consisted of a group of left-leaning 
artists during Allende’s time who sang for peace and social justice, Jara was a famous 
theater director, singer-songwriter, poet and activist under the Allende administration. 
Unsurprisingly, he was tortured and killed by the Pinochet government shortly after the 
coup. According to El Dínamo, “the Chilean composer concurs with university students 
and their desires to change the Chilean education system. He was captured by the military  
regime, his hands were smashed and he was later killed, but his legacy remains intact. 
There are men who death can’t even silence” (Carrasco 1).9 The author of the web article 
intentionally highlights Jara’s tragic relationship to the military dictatorship while 
discussing the student movement and makes the argument that he and the students 
fighting for change have the same dream. This is a clear example of the type of 
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8 Movimiento de la Nueva Canción Chilena
9 el compositor chileno se cuadra con los estudiantes universitarios y sus deseos de cambiar el sistema 
educativo chileno. Fue apresado por el régimen militar, sus manos destrozadas y luego asesinado, pero su 
legado está intacto. Hay hombres a los que la muerte no puede hacer callar.
relationship that Chilean activists believe the dictatorship has with the current education 
movement. 
 Another important band that the article mentions is called Los Prisioneros. While 
not part of the New Chilean Song Movement, this band became famous during the 
dictatorship for their social commentary, even though music was censored. Los 
Prisioneros became popular in the early 1980’s for its social critiques on things like 
machismo, but once the dictatorship was over, its turned to political critique. According 
to the article, their song “El baile de los que sobran,” which came out in 1986, is “perhaps 
the most important song to the student movement. [The band members] were against the 
Chilean education system and this song, which is over 25 years old, denounces it, 
remaining current today. One of the eloquent verses: ‘They said the truth to others, that 
thing called education10’” (Carrasco 1). In the eyes of Chilean protesters, the band whose 
message was repressed during the dictatorship carries the same message today, which 
validates their frustration and motivates social change. This is the same case as Ana 
Tijoux and Víctor Jara: The band’s platform is their experience with and stance against 
the dictatorship, yet their singles are considered quintessential anthems of the 2011 
student protests-- evidence that rhetoric about the dictatorship and the student movement 
is constantly being intertwined, and students are receptive to it.
Art
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10 Es tal vez la canción más contingente al movimiento estudiantil. González, Narea y Tapia se fueron en 
picada contra el sistema educativo chileno y esta canción de más de 25 años de antigüedad así lo denuncia, 
manteniéndose vigente hasta el día de hoy. Una de las frases es decidora: “A otros dieron de verdad, ésa 
cosa llamada educación”.
 One of the most prominent displays of memory I encountered in my time abroad 
was the movie No, directed by Pablo Larraín, which came out in 2012 and ultimately won 
an Oscar. The movie takes place in the late 1988, just before the plebiscite, where Gael 
García Bernal plays the creative director of an advertisement campaign for Chileans to 
vote against another two years of Pinochet in office. Stylistically, the film takes form of a 
documentary, where it is shot to match the film quality of the era. Much of the film uses 
real footage of not only the No commercial itself, but of protests and unrest that took 
place during the time as well. The campaign in the movie frequently references the NO+ 
campaign of 1983. This was a real art project created by Chile’s most influential artists, 
including Lotty Rosenfield, Diamela Eltit, Raúl Zurita, Juan Castillo an Fernando 
Balcells, who banned together to form a group called the Collective Actions of Art11 
(CADA), which used performance to challenge their country’s politics. On the ballot of 
the plebiscite, voters were to make a vertical line down a horizontal line next to either Yes 
-- or No --, making a + formation. In Spanish, the + sign means más, meaning both ‘plus’ 
and ‘more,’ making the NO+ mean ‘no more.’ “Wall tagging was the first form of NO+, 
but the slogan was soon used by different collectives all over the country as a massive 
public symbol of political resistance and non-conformity” (NO+ 1983-Present 1). 
 The use of NO+ became an important symbol leading up to the plebiscite, and 
although the movie does not directly address CADA as a group, their project was 
obviously an important contribution to the recent film because of its influence at the time 
and therefore to public memory of Chile. The movie is also about the making of the No 
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11 Colectivo de Acciones de Arte
campaign song, “La Alegría Ya Viene,” which means “Happiness is Coming.” All the 
while, the campaign director, played by Gael García Bernal, is a doubtful Chilean who 
does not think that Chileans will vote Pinochet out of office yet receives threats from the 
government due to his work. The end of the film shows the massive, exuberant 
celebration of the plebiscite’s results and casts a message of positivity and hope for the 
future of Chile.
 While the No campaign song itself is so upbeat and catchy that every older 
Chilean I spoke to told me that they still remembered all the words, it was a common 
saying among them that la alegría nunca llegó, or happiness of democracy promised 
during the plebiscite never came. This opinion is embodied perfectly by an op-ed 
journalist at El Ciudadano when talking about the film:
 No won, but instead of changing the Pinochet constitution, 
Concertación governed and legitimized it. No won, but the breach between 
rich and poor is still one of the most unequal in the world. . . No won, but 
education, health, precaution, highways and basic services are all still in 
private hands today which have indebted and isolated us Chileans. [. . .]
 And even though in 1988 No won, in 2012 nothing has really  
changed. The famous “happiness” never arrived. But what did arrive was a 
pile of material goods, microwaves, televisions, loan sharks, 
pharmaceutical and retail collusions, trash television, and a profound 
cultural shallowness that  has spiritually impoverished and isolated us.12 
(Sánchez 1)
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12 Ganó el NO pero en lugar de cambiar la constitución de Pinochet, la Concertación gobernó con 
ella y la legitimó. Ganó el NO pero la brecha entre ricos y pobres se mantiene como una de las 
más desiguales del mundo. . . .Ganó el NO y la educación, la salud, la previsión, las carreteras y 
los servicios básicos permanecen hasta el día de hoy en manos de privados que tienen endeudados 
y alienados a los chilenos. [. . .]
Y pese a que en 1988 haya ganado el “NO”, en el 2012 las cosas no han cambiado tanto. La 
famosa alegría nunca llegó. Sí llegó un montón de  bienes materiales, microondas, televisores y 
autos último modelo. Pero llegaron de la mano de las deudas, los créditos usureros, las colusiones 
de farmacias y retail, la televisión basura y una profunda chatura cultural que hoy nos tiene 
empobrecidos y extraviados espiritualmente.
 Sánchez obviously has a very negative perception of Chile’s current state. The 
film attempts to glorify the transition to democracy as an amazing achievement, but the 
journalist notes that upon the release of the film, the Chilean government made no 
comment that there was still work to be done in regards to Pinochet’s remaining 
constitution and economic model and instead took pride in Chile’s positive image from 
the film. It is also important to note that the Chilean education system was listed as one of 
the things still wrong with Chile in the context of the public memory of the dictatorship-- 
To the journalist, education is a major problem that is worth mentioning in the context of 
No.
 This is what another blogger had to say: 
Larraín intermediates the surface of history, so the. . . format [of the 
movie]matches the skin of a history that  is still being told, a fiction story 
that unites with archive material and varnishes-- trivializes-- the collective 
memories that get confused with history or conform to history. At the 
same time, it is interesting that the Yes and No campaigns are what 
construct the tension of the film-- images already  seen, already forgotten-- 
and come to propel a discussion that was once unpresentable. That current 
democracy is a product of marketing strategy. (Urrutia 1).13
 Urrutia makes the argument that there is an interplay between the time period of 
the movie and current day which is found both through the style of filming and suspense 
of not knowing the outcome of something that’s already happened. She believes that this 
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13 Larraín interviene la superficie de la historia, por eso el formato Umatic que permite igualar la 
piel de una historia que aún se está contando, un relato de ficción que se reúne con el material de 
archivo y va barnizando –banalizando- las memorias colectivas que se confunden con la historia o 
que conforman la historia. Por lo mismo, es interesante que las campañas del SI y del NO sean las 
que construyen la tensión del filme, imágenes –ya vistas, ya olvidadas-, las que llegan para 
proponer un discurso –otrora- impresentable. Que la actual democracia es producto de una 
estrategia de marketing.
ultimately means that the film argues that Chile’s current democracy, like the No 
campaign, is something that is simply being constructed by the hands of a private 
enterprise, which has been a recurring critique of the film (Khazan 1). Both bloggers 
believe that Chile’s transition to democracy has been a failure because of the 
government’s resistance to change. And for both of them, the conversation about the 
movie is important and necessary, which is exactly the desired result of a display of 
public memory: To cause the viewer to reflect on the display’s argument and to establish 
their own opinion, whether or not it is alignment with the display’s. 
 In the survey I administered to Chileans (upon which I will expound in the next 
chapter), I asked whether the respondents had seen this movie and whether or not they 
planned to in the future, and I received some interesting responses. Out of the 24 
respondents, only half said they had seen it. Most of the people who said they had seen it 
didn’t give any response, but those who said no I had some interesting responses as to 
why: 
 “I haven’t seen it, I don’t plan to see it, it’s a difficult history to remember.”14
 “I’m not interested in seeing it, in Chile it incites too much to look into the past 
and I
 think this movie only generates more division.”15
 “No, eventually. But I think this movie didn’t generate the same effect as 
Machuca when
 it came out, that which made public and massive the theme of social differences 
that are
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14 “No la he visto, no pienso verla, es una historia pasada dificil de recordar”
15 “No, no me interesa verla, en chile se fomenta demaciado mirar el pasado y esta pelicula solo creo que 
genera más división”
 behind today’s political problems.”16
 “Yes and no, I started to watch but got bored, I didn’t find that it represented what 
really
 happened in the country.”17
 “I’m not interested in watching Gael García Bernal try to talk like a Chilean. Also
 Chilean cinema is too politicized.”18
 As we can see, this movie been received in a myriad of ways. These respondents 
think that the film is too political and have chosen not to engage with this form of public 
memory, while some of the others who took the survey thought it was a well-made, 
important movie. I found some similar pushback when asked about another new form of 
public memory: The Museo de la Memoria discussed in the first chapter. When asked 
about whether or not they had been to the Memory Museum, a brand new, state-of-the-art 
museum in Santiago that focuses on the dictatorship, only seven people said they had, 
and only one student was of that seven. While multiple people said it was too far away 
from Valparaíso (a two hour drive) and almost everyone said that they did want to go in 
the future, I also had some interesting responses as to why people didn’t want to go:
“No, I haven’t thought to go, but I think it’s necessary that it exists.”19
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16 “No, eventualmente. Pero considero que esa película no generó el mismo efecto que Machuca cuando se 
estrenó, la que hizo público y masivo el tema de las diferencias sociales que está detrás de los problemas 
políticos aquella época y esta.”
17 “Sí y no, la empecé a ver pero me aburrió, no encontré que representara lo que sucedía realmente en el 
país.”
18 “No, no me interesa ver a Gael García Bernal intentando hablar como chileno. Además el cine chileno 
está demasiado politizado.”
19 “No, no me ha llamado la atención ir, pero encuentro necesario de que este exista.”
“No, one day maybe, but I think that it’s necessary to look towards the future and 
not keep ourselves in the past, filling ourselves with resentment.”20
“No, maybe, I think they abuse the theme of the disappeared detainees and human 
rights. Man does have rights and also should have duties and the Museum doesn’t 
mention that nor does it mention those in uniform who died at the hand of the UP 
guerrillas.”21
 The first response was something I found to be very typical of most of the 
respondents: There was an appreciation that it was there, but they did not show interest in 
making the trip to Santiago like I did while I was there. The third response was from the 
person who approved of Pinochet, who is biggest outlier in the survey. The mixed 
responses about not wanting to watch the “too politicized” movies or go to the museum 
were surprising at first, but on a deeper level, this resistance indicates an initiative to 
move forward into the future and not spend time dwelling on their country’s dark past. 
While going to the museums, watching the movies and learning the history of the 
dictatorship was extremely important to me as a foreigner who was trying to understand 
the country’s history and culture, experiencing those things was very jarring-- jarring 
enough for me to write my thesis on it. It is understandable, then, why a Chilean would 
think that it was good that those forms of public memory exist, but they would not 
necessarily go out of their way to see them. 
Public Memory in Protests
 While I have focused mainly on Chile’s student protests, as I mentioned in the 
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20 “No, algún día quizás, pero creo que es necesario mirar hacia el futuro y no quedarnos  pegados en el 
pasado, llenándonos de rencor.”
21 “No, tal vez, siento que abusan del tema de los detenidos desaparecidos, al igual que de los DD.HH. El 
hombre si tiene derechos también debe tener deberes y el Museo no lo menciona, como tampoco lo hace 
por aquellos uniformados que murieron en mano de los guerrilleros de la UP”
first chapter, Chileans have begun protesting everything-- Malls, taxes, electric plants. 
2013 marked the 40th anniversary of the coup d’état, and something interesting 
happened: In a rally for presidential candidate Marco Enríquez Ominami, Slate Magazine 
reports this scene:
“We’re going to make history today!” says the MC, a heavyset hype-man 
in an orange hoodie, as Latin rock pumps through the northeast corner of 
the Plaza de Armas. “A thousand people in Allende’s glasses! Yeah!” 
Campaign workers leave the stage with cardboard boxes full of imitation 
glasses—plastic lenses in the same kind of chunky black frames that the 
Chilean president wore up until the day he killed himself in the 
presidential palace as Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s forces bombed the 
building. The crowd, several thousands strong, surges against the 
barricades to grab the glasses.
Amid a spike in Salvador Allende’s popularity, particularly among 
younger Chileans, those glasses are icons—stenciled on sidewalks, printed 
on T-shirts, the inspiration for songs like “Allende’s Glasses” by Manuel 
García. And in the midst of a heated presidential campaign that just 
happens to fall on the 40th anniversary of Allende’s death, one could be 
mistaken for thinking that Allende himself was on the ballot. (Thornburgh 
1)
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Students play by a giant replica of Allende’s broken glasses
Source: Salvador-Allende.cl
 Along with this rally, a giant replica of Allende’s glasses as they were found after 
the bombing were displayed outside of La Moneda for the anniversary of the coup. 
Above, children are photographed with the glasses, wearing matching T shirts that honor 
his memory.
 These displays of public memory represent a paradigm shift in perception about 
Chilean history. On the 40th anniversary of the commencement of Pinochet’s regime, it is 
not Pinochet who is being celebrated like he probably was during the dictatorship-- 
Rather, the celebration is for the leader who was technically defeated that day in 1973. 
While the anniversary activity mentioned above was not necessarily a protest, it was a 
public display of memory that students like the ones photographed above did attend, 
which makes a statement about how teachers want that historical event to be 
remembered.
 As for the student protests themselves, memories of the dictatorship can be found 
openly in signs and artwork, demonstrating a certain relationship. One example is of a 
photo below of two protestors: One woman holds up a sign that says “Students teach us 
to be valiant” while the other’s says “Pinochet: Death to your Legacy,” a very similar 
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tagline as the photo I found of a protest sign in the Londrés 38 museum as discussed in 
Chapter 1. This protest took place in June of 2013 in Santiago, which was the most recent 
large protest. The word choice used in the first poster invokes strength and bravery of 
students while the second invokes death of Pinochet. Because these two protestors likely 
know each other (by the fact that they are standing and posing together for the picture), 
this indicates that to them, there is indeed a relationship between the student movement 
and the legacy of Pinochet. There is an intentional juxtaposition between the strength and 
death to argue that there is something to be learned from the students who are striving to 
kill Pinochet’s legacy. Obviously, this type of public memory makes a very specific 
argument about how Pinochet should be remembered.
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Women protesting in Santiago
Photo by Shirley Coenen
 Another example of the presence of Pinochet in the student protests is when a 
group of artists called Colectivo Casagrande, famous for their projects involving political 
statements, created a 10 x 4 meter, inflatable, King Kong-esque Pinochet and put it in 
front of the University of Chile in November 2012. Besides Pinochet hangs a sign that 
reads “170 years: The University of Chile United in the Strengthening of Public 
Education as a Right for a More Just Society.” According to the article posted about it, 
the inflatable figure served to “threaten public education,” which ultimately makes the 
argument that Pinochet was not a leader who believed in a “more just society” through 
education as the sign next to him suggests (Foto 1). Furthermore, this caricature of 
Pinochet does not actually invoke fear: King Kong is typically viewed as an antiquated 
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monster who fails to actually scare anyone anymore. The artists essentially argue that 
Pinochet’s education policies, while still present in the education system, should no 
longer affect education policy because they are, like King Kong, antiquated and 
diminished in power.
Pinochet as King Kong outside of La Universidad de Chile
Source: El Mostrador
 In April 2012, there was another protest in Santiago reported on by Aporrea, a 
Venezuelan news source that publishes articles on social issues in Latin America. In the 
photo they used to report on the protests, a college-aged girl is holding a sign that reads 
“Piñera = Pinochet. Education for the people, but quality education” (Primera de 2012 1). 
This student clearly believes that Piñera, the president at the time, was just like Pinochet 
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in that he was not providing quality education for rural Chileans. This poster is a call to 
action for students to get rid of Piñera, and therefore to get rid of the rest of Pinochet’s 
legacy, in order to achieve the goals of the student movement. 
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Girl holding a protest sign
Source: Aporrea.org
Conclusion
 In all of the examples of public memory mentioned above that were part of 
various protests within the last three years, it is clear that students and leaders of the 
education movement believe that Pinochet’s remaining policies are what is wrong with 
the current education system, and they are fearlessly willing to make a stand to change 
how he is remembered. This lack of inhibition to protest and speak out against Pinochet, 
despite his lingering popularity and policies, is indicative that perceptions of Pinochet are 
changing: Images of him that are associated with things like King Kong, violence, and 
corrupt politics are all displays of public memory that argue that his legacy is not one of 
prestige like he probably would have wanted, but rather, his counterpart Allende is being 
celebrated as the winner of the last 40 years. Public memories of Allende are more and 
more positive as Pinochet’s are more and more negative. This bombardment of negative 
imagery upon the public has polarized Chileans, and the youngest adult generation is 
proven to be not only the group who is perpetuating it, but they are highly receptive to it, 
as made evident by the results of the 2013 presidential election and their active 
participation in the student protests of 2013. Their beliefs about the past will ultimately 
affect future social and economic policies in Chile as the youngest generation becomes 
political and social leaders, which will greatly reshape Chile’s future as a democratic 
nation. To further my argument that displays of memory like the ones in this chapter do 
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indeed make an impact on Chile’s youngest generation, my next chapter provides 
statistical evidence that young Chileans feel worse about Pinochet than older generations.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Measuring Generational Feelings towards Pinochet
 In order to evaluate generational shifts in thinking about Pinochet as well as some 
of the other indicators of change in public memory, I decided to create a survey that 
asked questions that might help me gauge how people were feeling. The survey did not 
gain much traction-- I only had 24 respondents-- but the results are useful and insightful 
in terms of giving a snapshot of how Chileans feel about their past, especially among 
college students. In order to supplement my own results, I also found a survey done by a 
Chilean survey group that asked similar questions to a larger sample size. I will first 
discuss my results and then compare them to the larger survey in order to make an 
argument about generational change in perception of Pinochet, and then apply my 
findings to my discussion about protest and public memory.
Methodology
 I decided to use SurveyMonkey to administer my surveys to Chileans. The 
surveys were in Spanish and shared through Facebook. I asked my friends to post the 
survey on their Facebook pages and to share it with their friends and family so I could get  
a wide distribution of respondents of all ages. I also emailed my professors and asked 
them to take the surveys and share them.
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 While my sample size was small, my aim was not to find statistical significance, 
but rather to get a snapshot of ideas, which proved effective because of the amount of 
response I received from university students. 24 people responded to the survey; of them, 
17 were students and 7 were not. Everyone who took the survey who was between 18-24 
was a student. There were 5 respondents who were between 25 and 49, and two 
respondents who were 50 and older. In other words, 70% of the respondents were in the 
first generational age group, 28% were in the second age group, and only 8% were in the 
third age group as defined by my first chapter. This is how they responded:
 I chose to organize this chart by age, going from youngest to oldest, in order to 
see any trends that might emerge in the questions. The different colors in the chart range 
from lowest numbers being the most red with the highest numbers being most green to 
show level of intensity in certain responses. While the rest of the survey questions are 
listed in the appendix, the most important questions I asked are listed on the graph below 
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as Q1-Q5, which were statements that they rated from 1-10 in how much they agreed 
with it. For the sake of clarity, I will list them here: Q1 was “Pinochet’s economic 
policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s”; Q2 was “The economic policies were 
successful in transforming Chile into the stable country it is today”; Q3 was “Pinochet’s 
social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during the 1970s and 80s”; Q4 was 
“Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today”; Q5 was “General opinion 
about Pinochet.” The scale goes from 1 as strongly disagree to 10 as strongly agree. From 
here, it was easy to see certain trends.
Age Trends
 The students between 19 and 21 answered questions in the same way consistently. 
They believed that Pinochet’s economic policies did not benefit Chile during the 1970s 
and 1980s and they were not successful in transforming Chile into the country it is today, 
Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for Chile but still affect Chile’s social 
policies today, and they all very strongly disliked Pinochet. 
  Students between 22 and 24, however, had different answers. Question 1, 
regarding whether or not Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile during the 
dictatorship, was answered with answers ranging from 5 to 8-- a sharp contrast between 
the 1’s and 3’s that the 19-21 year-olds responded with. They also answered question 2 
with mostly 7’s, whereas the highest ranking the 19-21 year-olds ranked it 5 and under 
with mostly 1’s. They also believed that Pinochet’s social policies still affect today’s 
social policies in number 4, but not as much as the 19-21 year olds, who almost 
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exclusively answered with 10’s. Instead, there were only two 10’s, three 7’s and one 5. In 
the last question about feelings towards Pinochet in general, only one person answered 
with a 1 (whereas everyone but one person answered with a 1 in the younger group), and 
one person even responded with an 8, meaning they rather liked him. 
 The difference in responses between the 19-21 and the 22-24 age group is rather 
striking. This could be because the 19-21 age group is still in college, and they all stated 
that they participated in protests-- likely both the 2011 and 2013 rounds. However, the 
22-24 age group  was not as eager to participate in the student protests: Only 3 of the 6 
people said that they had protested. (Unfortunately, there is no credible data available to 
see how many students have participated in protests throughout Chile, making this hard 
to compare with a national perspective.) While this dichotomy could be due to the fact 
that there were less 22-24 year-olds than 19-21 year-olds in my sample, it is interesting to 
note that the youngest Chileans in the survey were the most passionate about how they 
felt about Chile’s past. This could certainly be because participation in protest requires a 
great deal of passion, so they are more likely to have stronger opinions about the 
questions than those who have not protested.
 The 24-49 group was also rather nuanced. There were two 24-year-olds, three 27-
year-olds, one 28-year-old and one 30-year-old, so this group was much less concentrated 
than the group of students, and therefore my results are likely less accurate in 
representing the entire generation than they could have been.  For the first question, this 
group was split down the middle, with 3 answers above 5, 3 answers below 5, and one 
five, which was labeled as “neither agree nor disagree.” In question two, this age group 
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believed that Pinochet’s economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country 
it is today much more than the students who were in college, with only one 3, one 7, and 
three 10’s. Question three was answered with all low numbers, which is consistent with 
the other age groups. They gave question four numbers between 5 and 7, much unlike the 
previous age groups, indicating that they believe-- but to a lesser extent-- that Chile’s 
social policies affect today’s social policies. Lastly, the three 27-year-olds gave a one for 
their general opinion of Pinochet, but the 28-year-old gave a neutral 5 and the 30-year-old 
gave a 3. This age group has an overall less negative perception about Pinochet and how 
his policies affect today, but their opinions vary greatly by age. This could be for a variety 
of reasons, such as whether or not they knew victims of the human rights abuses, had 
family associated with the regime, benefitted from his economic policies, and so on. 
 Finally, the 50 and 51 year old both gave 1’s to the first question, meaning they 
believed that they did not believe his economic policies were beneficial for Chile in the 
1970s and 80s. However, they both gave yellow answers-- a 4 and a 7-- to the question 
about whether those economic policies helped transform Chile into the stable country it is 
today. Neither of them agreed that Pinochet’s social policies were good for Chile during 
the dictatorship, but only one of them thought that those policies affected Chile’s social 
policies today: One gave that question a 7 while the other one gave it a 1. Finally, they 
both gave a 1 for their overall opinion of Pinochet. These results were surprising because 
I thought they would be the most nuanced age group because they had experienced the 
coup, the dictatorship and now democracy, but the two respondents were rather polarized. 
However, only having two respondents does not give a clear picture of the generation at 
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all, so these results are not very telling. Overall, the age trends found in my survey 
concurred with my hypothesis that the youngest generation of Chileans-- that is, 18-24 
year-olds-- were the most vehemently opposed to Pinochet’s legacy.
 Again, I must acknowledge how remarkably small my data set was. However, it 
still validates my argument about the effects of displays of public memory on the Chilean 
public because, at least among people in higher education (i.e., the grand majority of my 
respondents), there is a pattern of passionate distaste for Pinochet by the youngest 
generation of Chileans. As we saw in the last chapter, displays of public memory are 
being shown mostly to students, meaning they are indeed responding to the displays. 
Voting Trends
 Only three respondents said they did not vote in the last election. Out of those 
three, two of them participated in the student protests. One was 20 and the other was 27. 
When asked why or why not they chose to protests and vote, the 20 year-old stated that 
he was an “anarchist” who was “not interested in the presidential system” but protested 
because it was the “only medium for struggle against the dictatorial system.”22 The 27 
year-old said that he was out of the country during the election period, but he also said 
while he tended to associate with the moderate left, he would have not voted for Bachelet 
because she would not be able to fulfill her promises. Everyone else voted, and of them 
there were only four that did not participate in protest. One said he thought they “only 
serve to make delinquency;” one said she thought that “institutional changes in education 
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22 No estoy interesado en el sistema presidencial. . . [es el] único medio de lucha contra un sistema 
dictatorial. 
are generated by participating through internal means.”23 One girl stated it was because 
she was just floja, the Chilean slang term for lazy, and the other person who did not 
participate was the same person who gave Pinochet a positive score. My data set does not  
necessarily reflect the level of political activism as the rest of the country: Only around 
50% of the Chilean population turned out to vote in the 2013 elections, which was their 
first-ever voluntary election, which differs from the 92% voter participation in my survey 
(Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°70 Septiembre - Octubre 2013 93). This shows 
that on the whole, my data group was very politically active and passionate about their 
beliefs, and their views were largely in line with one another’s.
 Along the same lines, this proves once more that my specific data set is not 
representative of the Chilean population, so my results cannot necessarily speak for Chile 
as a whole. However, my data set does reflect the attitudes of upper-class, educated 
Chileans. While one could argue that this discredits my argument because the whole 
purpose of the student protests is for the poor to have more access to education, which 
would mean the opinions of rich, educated Chileans would be irrelevant, I will reiterate 
that the rich university students of PUCV, the University of Chile, and all the other 
wealthy CRUCH schools are highly active in the student protests. Therefore, my data set 
reflects the attitudes of the Chileans who are instrumental to the protests and will have 
the power to change the future of Chile in the long run. 
 It is certainly worth mentioning, however, that this survey was not adequate in 
defining changes in popular opinion between generations. While this part of my original 
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23  los cambios institucionales en educación se generan participando por las vías internas
hypothesis was not necessarily answered in a way that I would have liked, my data was 
sufficient for helping define the young generations’ attitudes, which is quintessential to 
my argument about how public memory has played a part in creating change in Chile 
because the displays’ target demographics have been the younger generations.
 (Because I did not get a good scope of anyone older than 22, and those who did 
answer the survey all had similar beliefs, I understand that this does not reflect the rest of 
the population. In order to compensate for this lack in my data, later in the chapter I will 
compare my study to a study done by CERC, the Center for Contemporary Reality 
Studies,24 which is a private organization known for its surveys on political topics, who 
did a similar study in September 2013 which had many more respondents of all ages.)
Trends in Feelings about Pinochet
 The general pattern I saw in my data was that the younger people were much 
more united in their feelings towards each statement, believing that Pinochet did not 
make any positive attributions to Chile either during the dictatorship or now. Their 
practically unanimous response to question four was, essentially, a social commentary 
about Chile: The grand majority of students had participated in the student protests, 
meaning that they disagreed with Chile’s current social policies, and their unified 
response to question four reflected that they blamed Pinochet for the education policies 
they are trying to change. In this sense, my hypothesis was correct: The youngest students 
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24 Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea
feel the worst about the legacy of Pinochet-- Or at least 15 students who (likely) attend 
prestigious private schools in Valparaíso do.
 The youngest group also did not believe that Pinochet’s economic policies were 
beneficial at all during the 1970’s and 80’s and generally did not believe that those 
policies have an effect on today, but the latter half of the respondents did. The 24-50 
groups gave much higher numbers to question two, meaning that they do give some 
credit to Pinochet for his economic policies whereas the younger people do not. Further, 
3 out of 9 of the latter age group had not protested while only 2 out of 15 of the younger 
group had not. This shows that the younger respondents are more actively against the 
remaining education policies from the Pinochet regime, and likely more ready to take a 
strong stance against his legacy. 
 In terms of question 3, every single respondent besides one answered with a 5 or 
below, and the grand majority of the responses were 1’s. This indicates that there is a 
general consensus across the board that Pinochet’s social policies were not beneficial for 
Chile in the 1970’s and 80’s, which is important because it demonstrates that there is no 
nostalgia when thinking about Pinochet’s policies, which is an important aspect of 
memory. There was one respondent who answered with a 7, but all of his answered 
generally favored Pinochet, giving his/her overall of him as an 8. This is also important 
because it demonstrates that there are still people-- even students-- who still support 
Pinochet today. 
 Overall, while the younger respondents were more passionate, the older Chileans 
who were surveyed had very similar outlooks on how they felt about Pinochet, but they 
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were less passionate, indicating that their feelings about him are more nuanced. My 
original hypothesis was that 25-50 year-olds would have the most negative perceptions of 
Pinochet, followed by 18-24 year-olds and then by Chileans older than 50. However, my 
survey results show that 18-24 year-olds were the most vehemently against Pinochet, and 
that passion decreases with age. This could be because the 18-24 respondents were all 
students who almost all have participated in protests and are therefore bombarded with 
rhetoric against Pinochet (such as the displays of public memory discussed in the 
previous chapter) while the older respondents have had more space to reflect on 
Pinochet’s legacy in a less polemic environment. 
Survey Comparison
 As I mentioned above, my survey was not a very adequate indicator of how 
Chileans feel as a whole, so to compare my responses, I found a survey done in 
September 2013 by CERC. The survey asked 1200 people throughout the country about 
various opinions they had on Pinochet and measured their responses by age. Their results 
are illustrated in graphs, of which I have chosen three to discuss in terms of my findings. 
The first one is a graph entitled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, 1989-2013”:
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  In this graph, we see how many people said whether the regime was “Some good 
some bad” (blue), “It was only bad” (red), “It was only good” (green), and “Don’t know/
no response” (purple). We see that the most popular response from 1989 until now has 
been “Some good some bad,” although it (along with “only good”) has generally 
decreased and “only bad” and “I don’t know” have increased. This not only provides 
insight into how people’s opinions have generally changed over time, but gives an 
indicator of how people feel now-- In 2013, the “only bad” belief is almost as popular as 
“some good some bad,” and almost no one thinks it was “only good,” which is in line 
with my survey responses. 
 The next graph is labeled “Opinion of the General Pinochet Regime, according to 
age”:
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 This graph has four categories: “It was only bad,” “It was good as a whole,” “In 
part good, in part bad” and “I don’t know/no response.” The youngest age group was 
divided rather evenly between bad, so-so and no response, whereas the 26-40 group 
mostly responded with bad or so-so, with more people saying it was bad and less people 
not responding. The 41-60 group also had more “in part good in part bad” than “only 
bad” answers, but they were not as polarized as the 41-60 group, and the 61+ group had 
similar answers. The age group who believed the regime to be good overall more than the 
other groups was the 61 and older group. The most important information to take from 
this graph is that the 26-40 year-olds believed more strongly than anyone else that the 
regime was only bad, and the 41-60 age group thought it was partly good and partly bad. 
Both of those findings line up with my original hypothesis that 26-50 year-olds would 
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feel the most negatively towards Pinochet while older Chileans would have a more 
nuanced view.
  While my own data set suggests that 18-24 year-olds are more passionate about 
their opposition to Pinochet, the survey done by CERC indicates that 26-40 year-olds are 
more passionate. While the results do seem to conflict, the 18-25 year-olds surveyed by 
CERC had a significantly higher portion of people who said that they either didn’t know 
or didn’t respond, which could potentially make the results less accurate. Either way, 
more research needs to be done in order to fully evaluate the question of generational 
shifts in thinking among Chileans, especially in regards to public memory.
Conclusion
 In sum, my survey data reflects that there is indeed a correlation between 
perceptions about Pinochet and age because the youngest generations of Chileans who 
took the survey were the most passionate in their answers. While the results for the other 
generations were less conclusive, I had significantly less respondents who were out of 
college, making my results less accurate. However, their opinions did essentially follow 
the general pattern of being less passionate with age. Because my results did not line up 
completely with the second survey, more research should be done on the subject of 
generational gaps in feelings towards Pinochet, and more research should be done about 
how that is affected by public memory.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
 Since the transition to democracy in 1990 until rather recently, Chileans have not 
sufficiently separated themselves from the legacy of their right-wing dictator, Augusto 
Pinochet. Their current voting system and constitution were set up by Pinochet just 
before he left office and still remain in place; his neoliberal educational policies are still 
intact. Many older Chileans argue that the alegría, or happiness, promised by the 
transition to democracy never came because the neoliberal policies imposed by Pinochet 
have hardly changed within the last 20 years. However, the youngest generation of 
Chileans is doing what no other generation has dared to do-- create that alegría 
themselves. They are protesting for reform, engaging in the discussion of his legacy 
through public memory, entering congress, becoming more and more passionate in their 
opinions, and ultimately, setting the precedence for the future of their country. What 
exactly these young Chileans do with their passion for creating a nation that is free from 
the grip of the Pinochet regime will unfold with time, but it is certain that Chile’s alegría 
is in their hands, and hopefully, what the No campaign song chanted 20 years ago-- la 
alegría ya viene-- is finally coming true; maybe happiness really is on its way. 
78
lxxviii
Works Cited
Ahumada, María José. “Bachelet anuncia fin al locro y gratuidad universal en seis años.” 
El
 Mercurio, 08 june 2013. Web. 11 june 2013.
Alcántara, Manuel, Ludolfo Paramio, Flavia Freidenberg, and José Déniz. Reformas 
Económicas
 y Consolidación Democrática 1980-2006. VI. Madrid: 2006. Print.
Angell, Alan. "The Durability of the Party System in Chile.." Trans. Array Party Politics 
in New
 Democracies. Oxford University Press, 2007. 275-303. Print.
Arzola, María Paz. "Bachelet y su propuesta en educación: más Estado." La Tercera. La 
Tercera, 11 Nov 2013. Web. 24 Feb 2014.
"Barometro CERC. 40 años después de la dictadura ." CERC. N.p., 27 Sept. 2013. Web. 
13 Jan.
 2014. <http://www.cerc.cl/cph_upl/A_4_decadas_del_Golpe_Militar.pdf>.
"Bases para un acuerdo social por la educación chilena." El Chileno. El Chileno. Web. 6 
Dec
 2013.
Bethell, Leslie. Chile since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993. Print.
Bodnar, John. Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism. 
Princeton,
79
lxxix
 NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Web.
Campana, Aur´lie. Public Memory, Public Media, and the Politics of Justice. London: 
Palgrave
 MacMillan, 2012. Print.
Carrasco, Hernán. "Diez canciones que musicalizaron protestas en la calle." El Dínamo. 
El
 Dínamo, 04 Aug 2011. Web. 28 Jan 2014.
"Chile Overview." The World Bank. The World Bank Group, n.d. Web. 17 Nov 2013.
"Chilean president seeks answers on protest death." BBC News Latin America and 
Caribbean. BBC, 28 Aug 2011. Web. 6 Dec 2013.
Coenen, Shirley. "Chile: Answers to the Education Crisis Are Political." Pulitzer Center 
on Crisis Reporting. Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 11 Jul 2013. Web. 24 
Feb 2014.
"Compendio Estadístico Proceso de Admisión Año Académico 2011." Universidad de 
Chile – Departamento de Evaluación, Medición y Registro Educacional. 
DEMRE, 01 Jun 2011. Web. 21 Mar 2014. 
Delannoy, Françoise. "Education Reforms in Chile, 1990-1998: A Lesson in 
Pragmatism." Country Studies. 1.1 (2000): 7-71. Web. 6 Oct. 2013.
Dent, Alexander Sebastian. River of Tears: Country Music, Memory, and Modernity in 
Brazil.
 Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009. Print.
80
lxxx
Dinges, John. The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to 
Three
 Continents. New York: The New Press, 2004. Print.
"Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública N°70 Septiembre - Octubre 2013." Centro de 
Estudios
 Públicos. N.p., 1 Sept. 2013. Web. 15 Apr. 2014. <http://www.cepchile.cl/1_5388/
doc
 estudio_nacional_de_opinion_publica_septiembre-
octubre_2013.html#.UzRPKJSgmgk>.
Fernandez, Eliseo. Student Protests in Chile. 2011. Photograph. The Atlantic, Valparaíso, 
Chile.
 Web. 6 Dec 2013
"Film shows positive message toppled Chile's Pinochet." Latin American and Caribbean
 Journal. LAC Journal, 06 Feb 2013. Web. 23 Feb 2014.
"Foto: Figura gigante de Pinochet amenaza a la educación pública." El Mostrador. El 
Mostrador,
 22 Nov 2012. Web. 8 Feb 2014.
Franklin, Jonathan. "Protests paralyse Chile's education system." The Guardian. The 
Guardian, 06 Jun 2006. Web. 17 Mar 2014.
Franklin, Jonathan. "Chile student protests explode into violence." The Guardian. The 
Guardian, 05 Aug 2011. Web. 6 Dec 2013.
81
lxxxi
Gaudi, Varun. School Choice In Chile: Two Decades of Educational Reform. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. Web.
Hecht, Lois. Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism and the Search of 
Development.
 1998. Print.
Holston, James. "Insurgent Citizenship in an Era of Global Urban Peripheries." City & 
Society.
 21.2 (2009): 245-267. Web. 27 Nov. 2013. 
"Indices: Estadísticas y Base de Datos: Estadísticas Pregrado." Consejo Nacional de 
Educacion. CNED, 01 Jun 2013. Web. 21 Mar 2014. <http://www.cned.cl/public/
secciones/SeccionIndicesEstadisticas/indices_estadisticas_sistema.asp>
Johnson, Reed. "Ana Tijoux: the political and the personal." Los Angeles Times. Los 
Angeles Times, 23 Aug 2012. Web. 26 Jan 2014.
Khazan, Olga. "4 Things the Movie 'NO' Left Out About Real-Life Chile." The Atlantic. 
The Atlantic, 29 Mar 2013. Web. 7 Feb 2014.
Koljatic, Mladen, and Mónica Silva. "Algunas reflexiones a siete años de la 
implementación de
 la PSU." Estudios Públicos. 120 (2010): 126-146. Web. 17 Nov. 2013.
Long, Gideon. "Chile recognises 9,800 more victims of Pinochet's rule." BBC News Latin
 America and Caribbean. BBC, 18 Aug 2011. Web. 27 Apr 2013. 
"Los exlíderes estudiantiles que arrasaron en las elecciones en Chile." BBC Mundo. BBC, 
18 Nov 2013. Web. 21 Mar 2014. 
82
lxxxii
"Los lentes de Allende." Salvador Allende. Salvador-Allende.cl, 15 Sept 2013. Web. 24 
Feb 2014.
Lucero, Leopoldo García. "Money won't compensate for my torture in Chile." The 
Guardian. The Guardian, 10 Nov 2013. Web. 29 Nov 2013.
Mackenzie, John. "Public School Funding and Performance." University of Delaware. 
N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Apr 2014.
Modiano, P. "La historica reelección de una víctima de la dictadura chilena." ABC.es. 
N.p., 16
 Dec. 2013. Web. 16 Apr. 2014.
"Museo de la Memoria, Chile." Flickriver. Flickriver, 16 Jan 2012. Web. 24 Feb 2014.
"NO+ 1983-Present." Hemispheric Institute Digital Video Library. Hemispheric Institute, 
n.d. Web. 30 Jan 2014. 
"Nómina de Personas Reconocidas como Víctimas en etapa de Reconsider ación." US 
Institute of Peace. US Institute of Peace, n.d. Web. 21 Mar 2014. 
Pastor, Daniel. "Origins of the Chilean Binomial Election System." Revista De Ciencia 
Política (Santiago). 21.1 (2004): 38-57. Web. 29 Nov. 2013.
"Presidency Postponed." The Economist. N.p., 23 Nov. 2013. Web. 10 Apr. 2014. 
"Primera de 2012: Marcha nacional en Chile en demanda de educación gratuita ." 
Aporrea. Aporrea.org, 04 Apr 2012. Web. 8 Feb 2014.
Riesco, Manuel. "La necesidad de reconstruir el sistema nacional de educación público 
desmantelado por la dictadura y la LOCE." Rev. Pensamiento educativo. 40.1 
(2007): 243-261. Web. 28 Nov. 2013.
83
lxxxiii
Roniger, Luis, and Sznajder Mario. The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the 
Southern
 Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
eBook.
Salazar, Paulina. "11 universidades rechazan la propuesta educativa del gobierno." La 
Tercera.
  03 Aug 2011. Web. 6 Dec 2013.
Sánchez, Matías. "La ambigüedad de “NO”, la última película de Pablo Larraín Matte." 
El Ciudadano. Periódico El Ciudadano, n.d. Web. 3 Feb 2014.
Setterfield, Cate. "Chile's Bachelet Sinks Her Teeth Into Education Reform." Worldpress. 
Worldpress, 13 Apr 2007. Web. 21 Mar 2014. 
Shelemay, Kay Kaufman. "Music, Memory and History: In Memory of Stuart Feder." 
Ethnomusicology Forum. 15.1 (2006): 17-37. Web. 28 Jan. 2014.
Siavelis, Peter M. 2005. "Electoral System, Coalitional Disintegration, and the Future of 
Chile's
 Concertación." Latin American Research Review. 56-82. JSTOR.18 Sept. 2012.
Staab, Silke. "Maternalism, Male-Breadwinner Bias, and Market Reform: Historical 
Legacies
 and Current Reforms in Chilean Social Policy." Social Politics: International 
Studies in
 Gender, State and Society,. 19.3 (2012): n. page. Print.
84
lxxxiv
"Tertiary Education in Chile." Reviews of National Policies for Education. Organisation 
for
 Economic Co-Operation and Development, n.d. Web. 17 Nov 2013.
The United Nations, "International Human Development Indicators." Last modified 2013.
 Accessed June 24, 2013. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CHL.html.
Thornburgh, Nathan. "Dead Man Running: How the ghost of socialist President Salvador 
Allende is changing Chile." Slate. Slate Magazine, 11 Oct 2013. Web. 8 Feb 
2014.
Trabue, Kathy. "Reforming Education to Target Inequality: The Chilean Experience since 
the
 1980s." University of Mississippi. n.p. Web. 6 Dec. 2013.
Urratia, Carolina. "NO la pelicula: Mas alegre que la alegría." La Fuga. Consejo 
Nacional de las Culturas y las Artes, n.d. Web. 3 Feb 2014.
Viñas, Silvia. Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "The Inequality behind Chile's 
Prosperity." Last
 modified Nov 23, 2011. Accessed June 23, 2013.
The World Bank, "The World Bank Databank: GINI Index." Last modified 2013. 
Accessed June
 24, 2013.
85
lxxxv
APPENDIX
Survey questions:
Name (Open answer)
Age (Open answer)
Are you a student? (Yes or no)
Political affiliation (Open answer)
Based on your experiences, rate the following statements from 1 to 10 (1 being 
disagree, 5 being neither, 10 being agree)
 Q1: Pinochet’s economic policies benefitted Chile in the 1970s and 1980s.
 Q2: The economic policies were successful in transforming Chile into the 
stable
  country it is today.
 Q3: Pinochet’s social policies were beneficial for Chilean society during 
the
  1970s and 80s.
 Q4: Pinochet’s social policies still influence social policies today.
 Q5: General opinion of Pinochet
Did you vote in the 2013 presidential election? For whom? Why/why not? (Open 
answer)
Have you participated in the student protests? Why/why not? (Open answer)
Have you visited the Memory Museum? Do you plan to? Why/why not? (Open 
answer)
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Have you seen the film No that came out in 2011? Do you plan to? Why/why not? 
(Open answer)
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